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Abstract  
 
The paper deals with two issues. First, it focuses on the analysis of Armenia’s trade performance 
based on the utilization of standard statistical models and develops comparative estimates of this 
performance relative to the peer countries. The comparison is undertaken in terms of trade 
openness, diversification, and composition. The main finding is that Armenia has been lagging in 
its export development relative to most CIS countries. The recent improvements in exports helped 
somewhat to reduce the gap. The second part of the paper provides for re-estimation of the “costs 
of blockade” effect. Armenia’s trade under-performance cannot be explained in terms of distorted 
government policies, because Armenia is recognized as a reform leader in the CIS. 
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Introduction
 
This paper focuses on the analysis of Armenia’s international trade performance 
in the years of transition based on the utilization of standard statistical models. It intends 
to compare the achieved level of Armenia’s trade development, and especially export 
development, to the “international norm”, i.e., to the average levels achieved by the 
countries that are at similar income levels, including other CIS members. The paper uses 
this international benchmarking to obtain estimates for the existing losses from under-
trading and under-exporting.  
 
The paper is broadly based on the ideas from the two recent reports by the World 
Bank (2002, 2003b), which were prepared with the participation of the authors of this 
paper. For this paper, we undertook a comprehensive update of trade information, ran 
additional analysis of the latest trends, and developed a completely new analysis of the 
blockade-related trade effects. 
  
We argue in this paper that the Armenia’s current under-performance in the trade 
area can not be explained in terms of distorted trade, macroeconomic and structural 
policies of the Armenian government, because Armenia has been among the reform 
leaders in the CIS since the second half of the 90s. Instead, this under-performance 
should be primarily attributed to the effect of closed borders with its neighbors, which 
continue to depress Armenia’s export capabilities. One of the primary objectives of the 
paper is to estimate the size of such a “blockade tax” and suggest how it has been 
recently developing. Using the more advanced models of international trade than were 
earlier available helps to get more accurate estimates of the blockade effect. 
 
 The paper has the following structure. The next section provides a brief 
description of the pre-transition trade arrangements and explains why the transition 
shocks were so painful for Armenian exports and the economy in general. The third 
section reviews the country’s export trends for the last decade. The fourth section 
presents two models of international trade which are used to develop a comparative 
evaluation of Armenia’s trade performance as well as to generate estimates of the impact 
of the blockade on volumes of both overall trade and export. 
 
Our ultimate assessment of the blockade is that, while still considerable, its effect 
is smaller than it is usually thought, and it has been declining steadily. At the moment, 
the blockade hurts Armenia much less directly (through higher transportation costs and 
lost volumes of exports) than indirectly -- through its overall impact on the depressed 
investors’ expectations, inflated international perceptions of investment risks and 
depressed levels of FDI. 
 
We also argue that at the moment the overall negative impact on competitiveness 
of Armenian exporters (thus loss of trade volumes) due to the remaining deficiencies in 
the investment climate is higher that one associated with the costs of blockade. Thus, 
advancing deregulation of the economy in the short to medium term would bring  greater 
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potential benefits for Armenian traders than lifting of the blockade. To support this claim 
we present a case study of a leading Armenian exporter. 
 
 
2. Armenia’s trade in the Soviet era and the shock of the early 90s 
 
During the Soviet period, the Armenian economy was relatively open, with the 
volume of external trade amounting to 103 percent of GDP in 1987, which was rather 
common for the smaller FSU republics. 1987 exports in domestic currency terms 
amounted to more than 50 percent of GDP, and the trade balance was close to zero2. The 
value of Armenian exports estimated in 1987 dollars was US$2.5 billion. The 
manufacturing sector dominated overall exports, making up more than 95 percent of the 
total. Among the individual sectors, the light industry3 had the biggest share, at 37.7 
percent, followed by machinery, food and chemical industries with 25.2, 14.3 and 10.0 
percent respectively. At the same time, before independence, Armenia was practically 
isolated from the rest of the world. For instance, in 1988, only about 2 percent of 
Armenian exports were shipped outside of the FSU.  
 
The pre-transition structure of Armenia’s economy, especially industry, proved to 
be quite vulnerable to external shocks (Avanesyan and Freinkman, 2003). This was 
primarily due to the role played by big industrial plants that produced mostly 
intermediary goods, with both suppliers and customers located in the rest of the FSU. 
These “core” industrial enterprises did not have a sufficient volume of internal linkages 
to other Armenian firms, and at the same time they had too little of their own marketing 
and development capacity, which dramatically limited their ability to respond to external 
shocks, including through changes in their output mix and/or by entering new export 
markets. Such a high dependence on export of parts, components, and tools (especially 
for defense use) to other FSU states, which accounted for about 40 percent of total 
industrial export, as well as on imports of raw materials, played a critical role in the steep 
decline of industrial output in the early 90s.  
 
Overall, the traditional Armenian export volumes could not be sustained at their 
Soviet levels after the disintegration of the FSU and market liberalization due to a 
number of factors that included: 
 
a) a sharp decline in defense and other final demand in Russia and other FSU states; 
b) the low competitiveness of Armenian goods, especially in the consumer sector, after 
energy and other subsidies had been withdrawn: FSU markets were mostly lost to 
competitors from lower-cost countries, e.g., Turkey and China;  
c) political factors that pushed Russian producers (e.g., in defense industries) to switch 
to local suppliers; 
d) new cost factors, such as increased transportation costs for Armenian goods. 
                                                 
2 However, the overall current account deficit in Armenia in 1987 was very large, in excess of 16 percent of 
GDP, and was financed primarily by the USSR central investment budget (Avanesyan and Freinkman, 
2003). 
3 Light industry includes textiles, footwear, leather, and garments among its primary components.  
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Avanesyan and Freinkman (2003) provided quantitative estimates for the 
magnitude of major transitional shocks for Armenia during the early transition, such as: 
 
a) impact of terms of trade shock, defined as deterioration of real incomes due to 
economic liberalization and shifts in domestic prices towards prices of the world 
market; and 
 
b) impact of external demand shock (market loss), defined as export losses due to the 
opening of traditional export markets to global competition and the deterioration 
of overall demand in these traditional markets. 
 
In particular, they suggested that because of the external demand shock, Armenia 
lost about US$2 billion equivalent in industrial exports (about 80 percent of its 1987 
export level or 25 percent of its total pre-transition industrial output). Respectively, the 
shift to world prices cost the economy about 17 percent of GDP in terms of lost incomes. 
 
 
3. Export performance in 1994-2002 
 
Thus the economic conditions for early transition in Armenia were highly 
challenging. The country lost about 60 percent of its GDP between 1989 and 1993. Total 
merchandise exports declined to US$215 million in 1994. However, after macroeconomic 
stabilization was achieved in 1995, the economic recovery in Armenia started, and since 
the middle of the 90s the country has been in the group of the best growth performers 
among transition economies. This ongoing growth episode could be divided in two 
intervals – before and after 2000.  
 
Despite relatively comfortable growth rates in the late 90s, the structure of growth 
in the first of these two intervals was a matter of concern (World Bank, 2001). A 
significant portion of the overall growth was generated either by one-time factors (e.g., 
recovery in the energy supply, privatization in agriculture), or by sectors that have limited 
potential for longer-term expansion (e.g., mining, metallurgy). Another driver of earlier 
growth, production of construction materials, was responding primarily to an expansion 
in public investments, which were largely financed with donor funds. At the same time, 
skill- and labor-intensive manufacturing, the sector where many believe Armenia has 
longer-term comparative advantages, remained mostly depressed.  
 
Weak export performance was one of the strongest indicators of the fragility of 
Armenia’s economic recovery in that period. In contrast to a number of countries where 
the acceleration of economic development has been export-driven, in Armenia total 
merchandise exports were low and unsteady (Table 1), and their average annual growth 
rates during 1995-99 amounted to only 2.6 percent. The merchandise export ratio to GDP 
was less than 13 percent, which was low even when compared to other CIS countries. 
The total average exports without diamonds, the largest export item with the low locally 
produced value added, amounted to only US$172.5 million per year between 1995 and 
1999, which was less than 10 percent of GDP. As a result, in the middle 90s, the deficit 
of trade balance exceeded 30 percent of GDP, which led to a considerable accumulation 
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of external debt. This poor export performance was directly linked to the depressed levels 
of FDI.   
 
Table 1: Armenia: Export performance 1994-99 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Total merchandise export (fob, US$ 
million) 
215.4 270.9 290.3 232.5 220.5 231.7 
Growth rate (%) … 25.8 7.2 -19.9 -5.2 5.1 
Export w/o diamonds, US$ million … 199.7 156.2 185.2 173.5 147.8 
Growth rate (%) … … -21.8 18.6 -6.3 -14.8 
Source: NSS. 
 
Starting from mid-2000, Armenia’s economic performance further improved. The 
average annual rate of economic growth in the four years (2000-03) amounted to about 
10 percent, macroeconomic stability was further strengthened, and the sectoral base for 
growth was broadened. The structure of economic growth has been gradually improving, 
reflecting a significant adjustment in the Government reform strategy. 
 
Several factors contributed to this improvement:  
• improvements in the business environment that included reductions in the 
administrative burden on the private sector, improved communications between 
the government and the private sector, and enhanced government capacity to 
promote investment and exports; 
• improved relations with the Diaspora, which somewhat increased the inflow of 
Diaspora investments; and 
• increased remittances, which to a large extent reflect improved performance of the 
Russian economy since the 1998 crisis. 
 
An improvement in export performance in the period between 2000 and 2002 
shows the effects of the new policy initiatives. The volume of total merchandised exports 
(including diamonds) increased by about 120 percent in three years. In 2002, exports 
excluding diamonds regained their highest post-Soviet level of US$200 million, which 
was previously achieved in 1995, and by 2002 exceeded this level by 53.6 percent (Table 
2). The deficit of trade balance declined from 31 percent of GDP in 1999 to 20 percent in 
2002. The sectoral decomposition of export growth also suggests a considerable 
diversification: while 21 percent of total export growth4 in 1999-2002 came from jewelry 
and diamond polishing, other major expanding export sectors included food processing 
(27 percent of the total), textiles (12 percent), and production of instruments and 
equipment (17 percent).   
 
 
 
                                                 
4 We use an adjusted measure of total exports that reflects diamond exports at their value added (i.e., gross 
exports excluding gross imports of diamonds). 
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Table 2: Armenia: Export growth 1999-2002 
 1999 2000 2001 2002  
  
Total merchandised export (fob, US$ million) 231.7 300.5 341.8 505.2 
Growth rate (%)  29.7 13.8 47.8 
Export w/o diamonds, US$ million 147.8 201.8 256.0 307.0 
Growth rate (%) … 36.5 26.9 19.9 
Trade balance, % of GDP 31.4% 30.6% 25.1% 20.4% 
Source: NSS. 
 
Characteristics of the trade structure5
 
The World Bank Report (2002) “Armenia Trade Diagnostic Study” provides an 
in-depth analysis of the Armenia trade trends for 1995-2001. Some of the main findings 
of the report could be summarized as follows: 
 
• Between 1995 and 1999, Armenia’s imports have grown faster than exports leading 
to an increasing trade deficit. The trade deficit declined in 2000-02, but still amounted 
to about US$500 million in 2002 (more than 20 percent of GDP). 
 
• There is a clear but declining difference in the structure of EU- and CIS-destined 
exports from Armenia; the former rely mostly on diamond cutting and polishing 
while the latter are heavily affected by the historical patterns of trade under the Soviet 
Union; the former consist mostly of skilled labor intensive activity (diamond 
processing) and natural resources, the latter rely more on natural resource-based 
products and capital intensive goods. 
 
• Armenia’s exports are excessively concentrated in a few product categories. 
 
• Despite its very liberal trade regime Armenia is not closely integrated into 
international production networks. High transport costs hinder Armenia’s 
participation since bringing semi-processed materials for further processing or 
manufactured parts and components for assembly, as is the case in many Central 
European countries, is not economically viable. 
 
• The on-going blockade of borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, resulting from the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, has heavily distorted Armenia’s trade patterns by 
increasing transport costs faced by both importers and exporters. As a result, the 
structure of Armenia’s exports is biased towards goods with high value relative to 
weight and discourages sales of bulky low costs products of light industry. Unlike in 
other transition economies, Armenia’s exports of textiles, apparel and footwear have 
been limited. 
 
                                                 
5 This section is based on Chapter 2 of the World Bank Study (2002), but utilizes more recent trade data. 
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• The effects of the border blockade are further exacerbated by domestic constraints. In 
particular, deficiencies in the operations of the Customs and the inability of exporters 
to obtain VAT refunds for imported inputs hinder international trade. Moreover, weak 
governance and poor business climate coupled with limited export opportunities 
discourage new entry, both domestic and foreign.  
 
As far as the geographic orientation of trade is concerned, Russia and the CIS 
remain important markets for Armenian exports. However, their shares, which in 2002 
were equal to 12.8 and 6.3 percent respectively (Table 3), went down after the Russia 
crisis and now are about a half of what they used to be in 1995. 
 
The European Union (EU15) has been growing in importance as a market for 
Armenian exports, which increased from US$70 million in 1995 to US$198 million in 
2002.  Overall they accounted for almost 40 percent of total exports, which is twice the 
combined share of sales to Russia and CIS. However, the EU share in imports (26 
percent) is smaller than the CIS’s share (30 percent), mostly because of the remaining 
dominance of Russia in energy imports. 
 
A notable characteristic of Armenian trade is the importance of the US market. 
Armenia trades more with the US than most of the small transition economies. Sales to 
the US, to a large extent driven by the presence of the Armenian Diaspora, registered 
more than a five-fold increase between 1995 and 2002 rising from US$8 million to 
US$46 million dollars. In 2002, they accounted for almost 10 percent of total exports. 
This is the most dynamic market for Armenian exports, albeit growing from a low initial 
base. 
 
Table 3:  Geographic Distribution of Armenia's Foreign Trade, 1995-2002 
  1995 1999 2001 2002 1995 1999 2001 2002 2002
 Export Value (US$ million) Export Share (%) 1995=100
Russia Fed. 57.7 33.9 60.5 64.6 23.0 14.6 17.6 12.8 112.0
CIS (excl. Russia) 31.5 21.3 28.6 31.7 12.6 9.2 8.3 6.3 100.6
EU15 70.1 106.5 88.6 197.7 27.9 46.0 25.8 39.1 282.0
USA 8.2 16.0 52.3 46.2 3.3 6.9 15.3 9.2 563.9
CEEC+Baltics 1.2 1.8 1.7 3.3 0.5 0.8 0.5 0.6 271.6
Others 82.1 52.1 111.1 161.7 32.7 22.5 32.4 32.0 196.9
World 250.8 231.7 342.8 505.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 201.4
 Import Value (US$ million) Import Share (%) 1995=100
Russia Fed. 142.1 149.9 137.2 170.4 24.9 18.5 15.5 19.5 135.7
CIS (excl. Russia) 55.3 37.2 36.5 44.7 9.7 4.6 4.1 5.1 196.9
EU15 124.0 252.4 302.8 252.2 21.8 31.1 34.2 28.8 206.2
USA 86.6 88.6 102.7 84.2 15.2 10.9 11.6 9.6 60.9
CEEC+Baltics 21.4 22.6 16.8 17.4 3.8 2.8 1.9 2.0 350.5
Others 140.3 260.1 288.7 305.4 24.6 32.1 32.6 34.9 215.2
World 569.8 810.9 884.7 874.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 173.3
Source: World Bank (2002) and NSS.   
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Note, however, that the figures on export structure may be somewhat misleading 
as a large part of EU-destined exports from Armenia consists of exporting diamonds 
brought to Armenia for cutting and polishing. The value added in this activity is equal to 
only about 15-17 percent of the final product’s value. If we restrict our attention to the 
value added rather than the total value of diamonds exported, the share of EU in total 
exports drops from 35.6 to 12.3 percent in 2000. 
 
About one-third of Armenia’s trading partners fall under the “other” category, 
which includes Israel, Iran, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, Cyprus and Turkey. Note 
that according to official statistics trade between Armenia and Azerbaijan is zero. Yet in 
reality goods exchange takes place between the two countries via Georgia where the 
goods are relabeled. 
 
Armenia’s exports are highly concentrated. The top five product categories 
included precious stones, minerals, machinery, base metals and food. As seen from Table 
4, during the whole period these five product groups accounted for more than eighty 
percent of Armenia’s total exports.   
 
 
Table 4. Composition of Armenian Exports 1997-2002, % 
Export shares Product group 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Precious stones and metals  23.7 24.1 43.1 40.4 35.9 51.1 
Mineral production 7.7 13.9 13.4 12.4 11.1 8.3 
Machinery and equipment 13.8 18.5 7.5 10.3 12.7 4.2 
Base metals and articles thereof 24.8 17.5 13.0 9.9 8.3 8.9 
Products of prepared food  10.6 7.6 6.9 9.1 14.0 10.8 
Textile articles 4.5 6.2 5.9 4.4 7.1 5.7 
Plastic, rubber 4.0 3.7 3.9 3.0 3.8 1.3 
Chemicals 1.9 1.0 0.8 1.1 0.8 0.4 
  
Sum of the above 91 92 95 91 94 91 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: World Bank (2002) and NSS. 
 
A popular way of measuring trade concentration is to use the Hirschmann index, 
whose values range from zero to unity, with higher numbers corresponding to greater 
concentration. As is evident from Table 5, the Hirschmann index for Armenian exports is 
much higher than for other FSU economies, especially in the years of booming diamond 
exports, such as 2002. The index showed substantial spikes in 1999 and 2002 putting it 
way above comparator countries. While the number of product groups being exported 
from Armenia has been steadily expanding, it is still lagging the Baltic countries. 
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Table 5. Armenia's Export Concentration Index 
  No. of Items Concentration  No. of Items Concentration
Country Exported Index Country Exported Index 
      
Armenia, 97 93 0.237 Russia, 99 222 0.261 
Armenia, 99 114 0.323 Moldova, 99 97 0.250 
Armenia, 01 157 0.237 Latvia, 99 188 0.211 
Armenia, 02 172 0.369 Estonia, 99 201 0.124 
   Lithuania, 99 210 0.113 
      
 Source: World Bank (2002) and own estimates. Estimated at the 3-digit SITC level. 
 
The structure of Armenian exports to the EU is a good indicator of the challenges 
Armenian exporters have been facing. In many transition economies, trade with the EU 
became a key driver of their export expansion, employment generation, and growth. 
Armenian exports to the EU consist mainly of diamonds (three-quarters of the export 
value in 1999 and half of the 2002 exports), gold jewelry, mineral commodities, and 
metal scrap. Notable is the absence of textile and apparel exports, which constitute a large 
share of EU-destined sales in other transition economies. For instance, in 2001, these two 
categories accounted for almost one-quarter of Lithuania’s and more than a half of 
Moldova’s sales to the EU. In Armenia this bias toward goods with high value-to-weight 
ratio, such as diamonds and jewelry, is clearly a result of the border blockade. Both 
diamonds and jewelry are transported by air and thus not affected by the blockade, and 
since they are high value items, the transport costs constitute a small share of their price. 
  
The blockade, however, is detrimental to low value large volume items such as 
apparel, where transport costs constitute a significant share of the price and adversely 
affects competitiveness.  Moreover, since a large share of clothing trade between 
transition economies and the EU takes place through the so-called outward processing 
arrangements, under which the EU buyers supply their partner firms in transition 
countries with designs, fabrics and other inputs, transport costs are incurred in both 
directions. In order to receive higher prices for their services, it is important for clothing 
producers in transition economies to be capable of responding quickly to changing 
demand patterns in the EU. The delays and unreliability of transport routes from Armenia 
make it difficult for Armenian producers to enter into this type of arrangement.  It is quite 
likely that in the absence of the blockade Armenia (in a way similar to that of Turkey and 
many other countries) could take advantage of its inexpensive labor and proximity to the 
EU and become a supplier of apparel to those markets under outward processing 
arrangements. 
 
Since raw diamonds are imported and cutting and polishing takes place in 
Armenia, only a relatively small percentage of the value of exported diamonds is 
accounted for in exports.  Therefore looking simply at export shares of different product 
categories may be misleading. In our analysis of export structure below, we present the 
export shares calculated taking into account only the value added to diamonds during 
their processing in Armenia (assumed to be equal to 17 percent of export price). Note that 
with this modification, the value of all EU-destined exports drops by about 60 percent. 
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With the above mentioned adjustment for diamonds, exports of manufactured 
goods account for 30 percent of Armenia’s sales to the EU (Table 6). This is at the level 
of the corresponding figure for Georgia, but below Moldova’s 53 percent and Lithuania’s 
68 percent share6. As mentioned above, the absence of textiles and clothing exports 
explain most of this difference.  
 
 An interesting feature of Table 6 is steady conversion of the export structure 
between various markets. While the share of manufacturing exports in trade with the EU 
has been expanding gradually, the one in trade with Russia declined from 55 percent in 
1999 to 28 percent in 2002. This suggests that Armenia continue to lose its transitional 
post-Soviet markets for goods with a high degree of processing. 
 
Table 6. Manufacturing Share in Exports, 1999-2002, %. 
 Trade with EU Trade with US Trade with Russia 
 99 00 01 02 99 00 01 02 99 00 01 02 
Share of 
manufacturing 
in trade 
 
24 
 
27 
 
35 
 
31 
 
70 
 
54 
 
48 
 
45 
 
55 
 
49 
 
39 
 
28 
 O/w: 
products other 
than 
diamonds 
 
9 
 
13 
 
24 
 
20 
 
66 
 
50 
 
41 
 
36 
 
55 
 
49 
 
39 
 
28 
Source: Own estimates based on the NSS data. Reflects adjustment for value added in diamond exports as 
explained in the text. 
 
The excessive concentration of exports in diamond and jewelry and heavy 
reliance on sales of commodities (such as ferro-alloys, crude minerals, etc.) makes 
Armenia vulnerable to demand and price shocks and is not a viable long-term strategy. 
There are, however, some encouraging changes that have taken place in Armenia’s export 
structure. For instance, since 1999, Armenia started to export some new manufacturing 
products, such as automotive and machinery parts, spare parts for watches, components 
of optical instruments, etc. But exports in most of these new categories remain small. 
 
 
4. Armenia’s trade performance in the cross-country perspective and “costs of blockade”7
 
In order to understand how Armenia’s trade performance compares to other 
countries, we used two popular trade models -- the openness model and the gravity model 
-- that broadly determine the association between intensity of countries’ trade flows, 
income levels, size and geographical characteristics. We pay special attention to a 
comparison between Armenia and other CIS and transition economies, which provide 
                                                 
6 Data for Georgia, Lithuania, and Moldova are for 1999. Note that if we do similar adjustments for 
Moldovan and Lithuanian exports (to account their main export of garments at its value added), the share of 
manufacturing in the EU exports in these two countries still will be close to 40 and 60 percent respectively. 
7 This section utilizes some results and models developed by the authors for Chapter 2 of the World Bank 
Study (2003b). 
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natural benchmarks for Armenia’s performance due to their common history of socialist 
past and transitional shocks of the early 90s. 
 
 Our main hypothesis could be summarized as follows. Armenian economic 
performance for the last 3-4 years has been favorably compared to that of other CIS 
members. Armenia has shown higher growth, stronger macroeconomic indicators (see 
e.g., World Bank, 2003a), and more progress in the area of structural reforms (Tables 7 
and 8). However, Armenia has been lagging the most advanced transition economies, 
such as the EU accession countries. Still, based on various analyses of the overall 
economic and reform performance, one should expect that Armenia’s trade performance 
should be at least on par or superior to that of its neighbors. And alternatively, if we find 
that Armenia significantly under-trades relative to its comparators, we believe that we 
have sufficient justification to claim that the main reason for such under-trading relates to 
the blockade, but not to the policies of the Armenian government.  
 
Table 7. EBRD Transition Index, 2002  
Armenia  3.0  
     
CIS-7 average, excl. Armenia 1/ 2.6  
Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine 2.9  
Balkan countries 2.8  
EU accession countries 2/ 3.5  
1/ Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. 
2/ Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia.  
Note: The index ranges between 1, which denotes lack of reforms and 4 that indicates completed 
reforms. 
Source: EBRD.  
 
 
Table 8. The Average Percentage of Total Annual Sales Paid in Unofficial 
Payments, 2002  
  
Armenia  2.9  
     
CIS-7 average, excl. Armenia 1/ 3.6  
Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, average 3.3  
Balkan countries 2.9  
EU accession countries 2/ 2.8  
1/ Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. 
2/ Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia. 
Source: BEEPS Survey by the IBRD 
 
 
Analysis based on the model of trade openness 
 
The theoretical hypothesis underlying this approach to the analysis of openness 
(trade integration) is that richer countries trade more (as a percentage of their GDP) and 
larger counties trade less. Following Rodrik (1998), variable for openness, measured by 
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the share of trade in the GDP, was regressed on GDP per capita and the country 
population, which was used as a proxy for the country size. 
 
Table 9 presents our regression results for different modifications of the openness 
model. The model was estimated on the averages for 1994-2001. All 166 countries for 
which trade and income data8 are available from the World Development Indicators 
database have been included in the pool. Thus, we have a much larger sample and more 
recent data than is usually available for such analysis. Of primary importance is that our 
sample includes all former Soviet republics. Following Rodrik’s approach, we included 
dummies for regional country groupings as independent variables in Model 2. As seen 
from the table, the dummy for the CIS is not only positive and statistically significant but 
among the highest in the world. The level of the CIS dummy indicates that, controlling 
for the income level and size, the CIS are more open on average than any other regional 
country group except for Eastern Asia. Our regression coefficients are in line with the 
ones in the Rodrik’s model estimated on the 1980s data. All country groupings preserved 
the sign of their respective dummies.9
 
As many countries, especially a number of low-income countries including 
Armenia, have been running significant current account deficits, it is interesting to see 
whether their trade openness has been mostly influenced by imports, i.e., whether export-
based openness is shaped much differently than more conventional trade-based openness. 
Models 3 and 4 in Table 9 include the export-to-GDP ratio as the dependent variable with 
the same independent variables as in Models 1 and 2. The estimated coefficients for 
Models 3 and 4 are qualitatively similar to those in Models 1 and 2. However, Models 3 
and 4 have much better statistical fit, i.e., import (not export) depends more on the factors 
that are not reflected in the model. 
 
Table 10 presents the comparisons of 2001 actual trade openness indicators for 
individual CIS countries with the theoretically expected openness that corresponds to 
their actual size and income. The “theoretical openness” corresponds to the regression 
line in the above models. 
 
The first conclusion that follows from Table 10 is that Models 2 and 4 with the 
regional dummies seems to provide fundamentally more accurate predictions for CIS 
countries. The predictions in Models 1 and 3 (without dummies) are too low: e.g., 
according to these models, central CIS countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and 
Ukraine) over-traded by 30-40 percent relative to the trade potential, which, in our view, 
does not correspond to a common view that these countries are not excessively opened. 
Therefore, our further analysis is based on Models 2 and 4. 
                                                 
8 As a measure of income level two variables were used: GDP per capita in current US$ and GDP per 
capita in PPP terms. We define the dependent variable -- the openness ratio -- as the ratio of exports and 
imports to nominal GDP. We used alternatively nominal GDP and GDP in PPP as dependent variables. 
However, the regression results that are based on nominal GDP as the dependent variable are very close to 
the ones based on GDP in PPP. 
9 The dummy for Sub Saharan Africa is found statistically insignificant from zero in both Rodrik’s and our 
model, although it appears to have different signs in these two models.  
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Table 9. Trade Openness Models 
 in PPP terms 
Source: Authors’ calculations ba cators; Rodrik (1998). 
 for statistical significance at 1% level; (**) and (***) – at 5 and 10% respectively. 
Secondly, if compared with their peers worldwide (Model 2 for total trade and 
countries – Armenia, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan – stand as 
serious
is part of the analysis is that Armenia has 
been lagging in its export development relative to most CIS countries as well as to low-
come
s is somewhat surprising, given 
striking differences in all other main economic indicators of these three countries. 
Armen
                                                
1
sed on the data from World Development Indi
Note: (*) stands
 
 
Model 4 for exports), three CIS 
 underperformers. Their realization ratios for 2001 vary between 0.60 - 0.73 for 
the total trade, and 0.50 - 0.84 for exports.10  
 
 Overall, our main conclusion from th
in  developing countries in general. The recent improvements in exports only 
reduced the gap but did not manage as yet to eliminate it. 
 
Finding Armenia in this group of under-performer
ia’s serious trade under-performance confirms that the blockade imposed on 
Armenia as a result of the regional conflict remains costly (Polyakov, 2001). As 
mentioned above, we claim that the factor of closed borders is the only plausible 
explanation of this finding. Thus, we used this result to estimate the economic “costs of 
blockade” for the Armenian economy. The estimate equals to the difference between the 
actual volumes of trade and exports and those that correspond to the regression line, 
given the Armenian fundamentals such as GDP per capita and population. 
 
Model 1 Model 2 The Rodrik model Model 3 Model 4
(1980-89 data)
ln population -11.0 (1.7)* -11.6 (1.6)* -15.5 (1.8)** -3.8(0.7)* -5.0 (0.7)*
ln GDP per capita1 8.3 (2.8)* 14.9 (4.1)* 12.1 (3.8)** 8.6 (0.8)* 9.5 (0.7)*
CIS -- 24.9 (11.7)** -- -- 11.3 (6.1)***
East Asia -- 63.8 (11.4)* 28.8 (9.6)** -- 34.8 (6.0)*
Latin America -- -13.3 (9.6) -25.6 (7.5)** -- -6.6 (5.1)
OECD -- -20.4 (11.0)*** -15.7 (9.2)*** -- -9.7 (4.8)**
Sub Saharan Africa -- 11.7 (9.0) -1.8 (7.8) -- 5.0 (3.9)
Intercept 111.3 (29.5)* 55.1 (41.1) 118.6 (36.9)** -- --
R2 0.26 0.44 0.60 0.79 0.84
Number of countries 166 166 119 166 166
Dependent variable: ratio of exports and imports to GDP
Dependent variable: ratio of 
exports to GDP
10 Two more CIS countries – Russia and Uzbekistan – have low realization ratios for overall trade, but their 
export performance is relatively strong. 
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 While in 2001 actual openness of the Armenia economy was 72 percent, our 
model suggests that the “normal” level for this indicator for Armenia would be 103 
Table 10. CIS Actual vs Theoretical Openness, 2001 
  Trade to GDP 
ts to GDP 
  
percent. For 2002 the respective ratios are 75 percent and 106 percent. It suggests that 
annual losses of total trade fall in the interval of US$655-730 million or about 30 percent 
of GDP.  
 
  
Expor
  
Realization ratios 
ted by 
atios 
ed by (actual/predic
the model) 
Realization r
(actual/predict
the model) 
  
Actual Actual 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
              
Armenia 72 26 
    
n 81 
1
epublic 
 
0.8 0.7 0.6 
  
0.5 
        
Azerbaija
elarus 
1.0 
1.6 
0.8 
1.3 
42 
68 
1.2 
0.9 
1.0 
0.8 B 39 
Georgia 
an 95 
60 0.7 0.6 22 0.6 0.5 
Kazakhst 1.3 1.0 46 1.4 1.2 
Kyrgyz R 73 0.9 0.7 37 1.0 0.8 
Moldova 124 1.5 1.3 50 1.5 1.2 
Russian Federation 61 1.1 0.8 37 1.1 1.0 
Tajikistan 140 1.9 1.7 64 2.3 1.8 
Turkmenistan 94 1.1 0.9 47 1.2 1.0 
Ukraine 111 1.8 1.4 56 1.9 1.6 
Uzbekistan 
:
56 0.9 0.7 28 1.5 1.3 
Averages     
rmenia) 
 Armenia) 1/ 
        
CIS (excl. A
l.
94 
89 
1.3 
1.1 
1.0 
1  
45 
41 
1.3 
1  
1.1 
1  CIS-7 (exc .0 .4 .1
Central CIS 2/ 101 1.5 1.1 52 1.3 1.1 
1 yz Republic, ldova, stan, U stan  
2 khstan, Russia, Ukraine 
ents our estimates for losses in Armenia’s exports. It suggests that 
e country may lose about US$420 million a year due to the blockade.11 It is worth 
                                                
/ Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrg Mo Tajiki zbeki
/ Belarus, Kaza
Source: Own estimates. 
 
 Table 11 pres
th
noting that the relative cost of the blockade in GDP terms has been steadily declining – 
from 23 percent in 1999 to 18 percent in 2002. This reflects the fact that with time the 
private sector operators found various ways to reduce the impact of the blockade on their 
activities, which for example is seen in gradual reduction in transportation tariffs (World 
Bank, 2001). It is worth noting that these numbers are smaller than estimates obtained by 
Polyakov (2001) for the earlier period of the mid-90s12. Overall, since 1999, a 
considerable catch up in Armenian exports has taken place, while the blockade gradually 
becomes less binding. 
 
11 Thus, export losses represent about two-thirds of the total trade losses. 
12 Polyakov (2001) estimated that under-exporting amounted to 30 percent of the annual average GDP for 
the period of 1995-98. 
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Table 11. Armenia: Estimated Exports to GDP Ratio, Using the 
Openness Model.  
  01 2002 1999 2000 20
Actual export/GDP ratio, %  20.8 23.4 25.6 29.2 
Projected ratio, using model 4, % 
 4, mln $ 
2  2 2  1  
43.9 44.8 45.8 47.1 
Under-exporting, using model 428 409 428 422 
Under-exporting, as % of GDP 3.2% 1.4% 0.2% 7.8%
S
 
nalysis based on the gravity model  
s the standard framework for the analysis of the 
irection of international trade, more specifically, of the potential and the realized trade 
flows. 
ur analysis we applied a relatively new version of the gravity model, 
stimated by Frankel (1997) with the 1992 data on the sample of 63 countries (with the 
CIS no
rst type, 
hich describes total bilateral trade flows, as was estimated by Frankel (1997). The 
applied
/popj)  
       (0.469)  (0.018)   (0.019) 
+ .445 ( djij) + angij) + γ (Blocij) + uij   
 (0.038)            (0.157)   (0.090) 
  
                                                
ource: Own estimates. 
 
A
 
The gravity model represent
d
It allows the incorporation into analysis of several additional factors that have a 
critical importance for international trade, including those of economic and political 
geography. Despite theoretical controversies surrounding the model since its inception 
(which have been somewhat alleviated recently), the gravity model has proven to be the 
most accurate tool for the explanation and the prediction of bilateral trade flows. Earlier 
analysis of intra-CIS trade, based on the gravity model, was undertaken by Kaminski et 
al. (1996).   
 
For o
e
t included). The main distinction of this model is that it explains bilateral total 
trade flows (exports plus imports), and thus it helps to answer the question whether given 
trade partners under-trade or over-trade among themselves in comparison with other 
countries with similar characteristics.13 Frankel’s model has also an additional advantage: 
it has an expanded set of dummies explicitly incorporating the trade bloc effects. 
 
For the analysis of potential trade in the CIS, we used the model of the fi
w
 gravity equation is the following (with standard errors is parenthesis): 
 
log(Tij) = - 12.146 + 0.930 log(GNPi GNPj) + 0.128 log(GNP/popi GNP
 
- 0.770 log(Distij)  0 A  0.768 (L
 
       
 
13 The model used by Kaminski et al. (1996) used the older data and answers the question if the given 
country under- or over-exports to certain destinations.   
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where Tij is the tr try i to 
The bloc dummy is the most powerful dummy in this model. The higher the 
estimat
As explained in the World Bank (2003b) report, we have a reason to believe that 
In our opinion, the same factors of geographical remoteness explain the high 
value f
                                                
ade turnover between countries i and j (that is exports from coun
country j plus imports of country i from country j), GNP is the nominal Gross National 
Product, GMP/pop is the nominal per-capita GNP, Dist is the great circle distance 
between the main commercial centers (countries’ capitals with a few exceptions14), Adj is 
the adjacency dummy (equals one for adjacent countries and zero otherwise), Lang is the 
language dummy (equals one for countries sharing the same language15), Bloc is the bloc 
dummy (equals one for countries in the same trading bloc), and uij is the error term. 
 
e for the bloc dummy, the more trade is predicted among the members of the bloc, 
controlling for all other factors. Therefore, each dummy estimates the trade creation 
effect of the bloc (rather than trade diversion). The original model has six dummies for 
six different trade blocs: the EU, the NAFTA, the Mercosur bloc, the Andean bloc, the 
ASEAN, and the Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area. The estimators for the trade 
bloc dummies vary widely – from insignificantly different from zero for the EU and 
NAFTA16 to 1.766 for the ASEAN.  
 
 
the CIS countries also form a natural trade block, and members tend to trade relatively 
more with each other than with the rest of the world. This justifies a need for adding an 
extra dummy for the CIS to Frankel’s model.17 Without developing a new global gravity 
model that would explicitly have a separate bloc dummy for the CIS, we might suggest 
only a preliminary indication of the revealed bloc effect for the CIS. Our indirect proxy 
estimates for such an effect suggest that the value of respective coefficients in the late 90s 
would fall in the range of 1.8-1.9, which is close to the values of dummies for both the 
ASEAN and the Australia – New Zealand FTA. The powerful bloc effects for these two 
groupings can be largely explained by geography: These countries are located on the 
periphery of the world trade flows, far from the global trade center of gravity and hence 
are “forced” by geography to trade excessively among themselves (Smarzynska, 2001).  
 
or the coefficient that reflects impact of the CIS block. In addition, other factors 
underlying the strength of the CIS bloc effect include the common economic history of its 
members, high complementarities of their economies, similarities in the accumulated 
stock of technologies and skills, and the same market transition process they all undergo, 
albeit with various speeds and detours. These factors far exceed the usual effects of 
 
14 Almaty for Kazakhstan, Yekaterinburg for Russia in the case of trade with Asia and Moscow otherwise, 
Bonn for Germany, and Chicago for the U.S. 
15 All CIS countries share the same language (Russian) while conducting trade. 
16 Frankel (1997) explains the insignificance of the bloc effect for these two groupings through higher-than-
average openness of the participating countries. As these countries trade more than average with all their 
partners, the bloc effect could not be detected under this equation specification.  Frankel goes on to single 
out the bloc effects for these countries by controlling for openness in the gravity equation. 
17 One of the reasons for this relates to the fact that without such a dummy the predictions of Frankel’s 
model for CIS countries are too low. As it was the case of the openness model without regional dummies, 
the original gravity model suggests that on average the CIS countries have over-developed levels of 
international trade. 
 17
shared borders and common language, captured by the relevant variables of the gravity 
model.  
 
Tables 12-13 present the 2001 realization ratios for all CIS countries. The 
number
Table 12. CIS: Realization Ratios for Total Volumes of Trade Based on the Gravity 
 Total trade 
with 
with EU   
s in the Tables reflect the ratio between the actual trade volumes18 and projections 
obtained from the gravity model. The actual estimates in Tables 12-13 were obtained 
based on the value for CIS dummy coefficient equal to 1.766, i.e., identical to the one for 
the ASEAN block. 
 
Model, 2001 
CIS 
          
Armenia 1  1  0  .0 .0 .9   
          
Azerbaijan 1  0  1  .1 .6 .9   
Belarus 0.9 1.2 0.6   
Georgia 1.0 0.6 1.0   
Kazakhstan 1.5 1.6 1.7   
Kyrgyz Republic 1.3 1.5 1.1   
Moldova 1.9 2.6 1.4   
Russian Federation 1.1 1.1 1.1   
Tajikistan 3.2 5.3 1.7   
Turkmenistan 1.3 1.8 0.5   
Ukraine 1.1 1.1 1.0   
Uzbekistan 1.0 1.4 0.9   
Simple averages:         
CIS (excl. Arm 1  1  1  enia) .4 .7 .2   
CIS-7 (excl. Armenia) 1/ 1.6 2.0 1.3   
Central CIS 2/ 1.1 1.2 1.1   
1/ Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Ta tan, Uzbe  
Table 13. Armenia: Realization Ratio for the Gravity Model 
jikis kistan
2/ Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine  
Source: Own estimates. 
 
  002 1999 2000 2001 2
Total trade  1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 
CIS-7 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 
Central CIS 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.8 
EU 1.0 1.3 0.9 1.0 
Eastern Europe 0.9 0.6 0.5 1.0 
Other 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.5 
N tio for actual to predicted trade volumes (export + i t) 
ekistan 
                                                
ote: Ra mpor
1/ Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Uzb
2/ Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine 
Source: Own estimates. 
 
 
18 Given the problems with the quality of statistical data on CIS trade, actual trade volumes were estimated 
by using both national and mirror statistics, i.e., actual volumes of export and import to the CIS countries 
were estimated as simple averages of the numbers, provided by these two data sources. 
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 The main finding from the analysis based on the gravity model is, in our 
terpre
We believe that the gravity model provides more accurate estimates for 
realizat
It is important to underline that our finding of the absence of under-trading relates 
a) Very high imports and respectively large trade deficits, which are funded by 
b) e the country’s overall 
 
In other words, the gravity results do not mean that the blockade effect is 
insignif
e also would like to make one more caveat with respect to the comparisons of 
openne
ur ultimate assessment of the blockade is that it hurts Armenia much less 
directly (through higher transportation costs and lost volumes of exports) than indirectly -
in tation, that the actual burden of the blockade for Armenian economy is in fact 
even smaller than those based on a simpler model of trade openness. While the gravity 
analysis in Table 12 still suggests that Armenian international trade is less developed than 
on the average in its CIS neighbors, we did not find any confirmation that Armenia 
significantly under-trades relative to its current economic potential and taking into 
account its geographic fundamentals: the realization ratios for Armenia in 1999-2002 
were close to 1. 
 
ion of the countries’ trade potential than the openness model, because it explicitly 
takes into account several additional important factors related to economic geography 
(location). It may be that the openness model overestimates potential trade volumes for 
small and remote economies that have primarily poor neighbors, for which distances to 
major markets become quite significant. 
 
 
to the total trade volumes (exports+imports), and it does not mean that Armenian export 
volumes are sufficiently developed. The relatively high realization ratios for Armenia to a 
large extent derive from two sources:  
  
remittances, private transfers, and international assistance. 
Expansion in diamond trade that greatly helped to improv
trade aggregates, but brought relatively limited benefits to the economy (if 
compared to more traditional manufacturing exports) due to limited employment 
opportunities and insufficient linkages to the rest of the domestic economy. 
icant, because both models are in an agreement that Armenia’s exports remain 
below the “normal” level. The gravity model estimate for export losses due to the 
blockade amounts to a half of the current trade deficit, i.e., 12.5 percent of GDP in 2001 
and 10 percent of GDP in 2002. However, the gravity model also confirms that the under-
trading is much smaller than many people think, and it clearly has been declining.  
 
W
ss and gravity model results. Because it is so much simpler, the openness model is 
based on a larger sample (166 countries) and more recent data (average trade flows for 
1994-2001). The gravity model is based on 63 countries, excluding the CIS, and uses the 
1992 data. Given rapid expansion of international trade through the 90s, it could be that 
the gravity projections based on the older data are downwards biased. How large this bias 
is would be impossible to say without developing an entirely new global gravity model 
that would use both the new data and a larger sample. 
 
O
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- throu
al information with respect to re-orientation of 
Armenia’s trade flows. Thanks primarily to the diamond trade, Armenia undertook a 
major 
5. Costs of blockade in a comparative perspective and policy conclusions
gh its overall impact on the depressed investors’ expectations, inflated 
international perceptions of investment risks and depressed levels of FDI, and therefore 
on economic growth and general under-development, and through these parameters 
indirectly on the current trade volumes. 
 
Table 13 also provides addition
restructuring of its trade geography. The initial over-trading with other former 
Soviet republics has entirely disappeared. In fact, Armenia somewhat under-trades with 
several of its CIS neighbors, especially Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine.19 At the same 
time, Armenia trades much above the model predictions with several other regional 
partners, such as Israel, Iran and the United Arab Emirates. 
 
 
 
 
 the magnitude 
f the effect of closed borders on Armenian economy. First, if estimated with the help of 
the gra
mportance of the effect of closed borders, it should 
e placed in a comparative perspective, i.e., its impact has to be compared with other 
factors 
blockade is the central 
development constraint for Armenia, and calls for both the government and international 
                                                
The previous analysis provides several conclusions with respect to
o
vity model, the estimates for costs of blockade may be lower than it was earlier 
considered based on simpler statistical models, and could be placed into a range of 10-13 
percent of GDP. Second, it is clear that the blockade effect has been eroding over the last 
4-5 years as the private sector has found ways to reduce transportation costs within 
existing political constraints. Third, even the most radical estimates of under-exporting, 
based on the model of openness, suggest that annual export losses in 2002 declined to 
less than 18 percent of GDP. While considerable, this amount does not represent a major 
development constraint for Armenia. 
 
To understand better the real i
b
that affect Armenian exporters and importers. In this paper, we argue that despite 
recent improvements in the business environment, Armenian firms are still facing major 
unnecessary administrative barriers in their operations that inflate their costs and 
undermine their capacity to compete and export. The overall loss of trade due to the 
remaining administrative burden at the moment is higher than one associated with the 
costs of blockade. We present below a case study of a leading Armenian exporter to 
support our claim that advancing deregulation of the economy in the short to medium 
term would bring much more potential benefits for Armenian traders than lifting the 
blockade. The case study illustrates that under the current circumstances the exporter’s 
losses from the administrative hurdles represent a larger threat for its competitiveness 
than additional transportation charges deriving from the blockade. 
 
 In his recent paper, Richard Beilock (2003) argues that the 
donors to place the issue of blockade removal in the center of government strategy. The 
author basically reasons that each project in Armenia should be reviewed from the 
 
19 Overall, Armenia is less reliant on sales to the CIS than for example Georgia and Moldova. 
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position of how it influences the issue of blockade. He is concerned that some projects 
(e.g., those that aim at reduction in transportation costs) undermine incentives to lobby 
for opening the Armenian borders and as such they are strategically incorrect. 
 
In the view of the authors of this paper, public opinion continues to overestimate 
e actual costs of blockade for Armenia. Respectively, any recommendation that intends 
to mak
bal Economic Prospects 2004 makes a special 
mphasis on non-transport factors in trade facilitation as a key determinant of countries’ 
ase Study: Export barriers for a leading metal exporter
ading Armenian metallurgical 
ompany, which produces blister copper and sells it primarily in Europe. The company 
annual 
esent a significant expenditure item for the ACP. 
espite unit costs (per ton) of transportation to its primary market in Germany declined 
by 20 p
                                                
th
e even more emphasis on the costs of blockade may indirectly disorient the 
government and international community with respect to real relative importance of 
different development constraints, and this could result in wrong prioritization of 
government policies. Because, as we believe, Armenia has been losing much more from 
the deficiencies in the business environment than from the blockade, the top priority of 
the government policy should be aimed at all those elements of the investment climate, 
which in contrast to blockade do not require complicated international negotiations but 
are entirely under the government control. 
 
 The World Bank (2003c) report Glo
e
ability to participate in global economy. It singles out such policies as improvements in 
customs administration, regulatory environment, and availability for traders of services 
sector infrastructure. The OECD (2001) paper summarizes various available quantitative 
estimates of the impact of various trade facilitation measures on costs of international 
trade. For instance, Hummels (2001) concludes that each day saved due to a faster 
customs clearance is worth 0.5 percent reduction of ad-valorem import tariff.  
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Armenian Copper Programme (ACP) CJSC is a le
c
sales are about US$12 million, and it exports practically everything it produces, 
which makes its share in the total country non-diamond export equal to about 5 percent as 
of 2002. The ACP has more than 700 employees. Despite not being able to generate 
profits yet, the firm pays to the budget about US$240 thousand a year in various taxes 
and mining/environmental fees. 
 
The transportation costs repr
D
ercent between 2000 and 2003, the company spends about 4-5 percent of its sale 
revenues on transport. If the blockade is lifted, the ACP estimates that its transportation 
bill would decline by half, with a net savings of about $250 thousand a year. It is 
important to distinguish between two components of these savings. A smaller fraction of 
it (about 30 percent) would come from opening the Turkish border and respectively from 
less expensive export shipments. The rest would come from opening the borders with 
Azerbaijan (Nakhichevan) and re-opening the railway through Nakhichevan, which 
 
20 Information was collected through interviews with Dr Gagik Arzumanyan, the CEO of Armenian Copper 
Programme. 
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would allow for major savings on domestic shipments (from the South to the North of 
Armenia).  
 
The costs of blockade, although significant, do not look too high when compared 
 the company’s costs associated with the remaining deficiencies in the business 
environ
Overall, from the company perspective, further steps to de-regulate the economy 
ould bring much more potential benefits than lifting the blockade.  
 
o not think that ACP's data could be simply generalized for the rest of Armenia 
econom
to
ment. The ACP management believes that the total administrative burden is three 
times higher than the value of the “blockade tax” and exceeds $750 thousand a year. 
First, the firm is affected by chronic arrears of the VAT refund, which in the second part 
of 2003 amounted to about US$1.3 million. At the prevailing rates of domestic borrowing 
(20 percent), the ACP incurs almost quarter of a million in extra interest costs due to an 
additional borrowing from commercial banks. Second, the estimate for additional costs 
associated with the complicated regulatory environment and non-transparent enforcement 
is in the range of 5 percent of company’s sales, which exceeds half a million dollars a 
year. 
 
w
We do not claim here that the ACP is a representative exporter and therefore we 
d
y. However, the case study confirms, in our view, that there are major factors that 
are under direct Government control, which are supposed to be relatively easy to deal 
with and which have direct significant impact on export performance and economic 
growth in general. 
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